Legal Scholarship at the Crossroads:  On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption Commentary by Krotoszynski, Ronald J., Jr.
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Essays, Reviews, and Shorter Works Faculty Scholarship 
1998 
Legal Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and 
Redemption Commentary 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. 
University of Alabama - School of Law, rkrotoszynski@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_essays 
Recommended Citation 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Legal Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption 
Commentary, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 321 (1998). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_essays/35 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Essays, Reviews, and Shorter Works by an authorized 
administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly Commons. 
Commentary
Legal Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce,
Tragedy, and Redemption
by Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.*
For some time, multiple constituencies within the legal community
have waged a pitched battle over the direction of legal scholarship in the
United States. Historically marginalized groups within the legal academy
have demanded-and in some measure have received-voice through the
nation's preeminent national law reviews. Although doctrinal scholarship
continues to fill the pages of many law reviews, persons of color, women,
and gays and lesbians have offered alternative visions of the scholarly
project, establishing a beachhead within the mainstream of the American
legal academy. Providing a variety of postmodernist critiques, these
groups have challenged more traditional legal scholars to re-examine what
counts as scholarship and to consider the possibility that alternative
conceptions of the scholarly project possess both utility and quality.
This evolution in legal scholarship has not been without controversy.
Just as the Legal Realists faced opposition from those wedded to the notion
of legal science,' so too postmodernist legal narratives have been subjected
to attack and vilification.2 At the moment, the ultimate outcome of the
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary;
Assistant Professor Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. J.D., LL.M., Duke
University. I wish to thank Professors William Van Alstyne, Jim Lindgren, Neal Devins, Michael
Heise, Allen Meese, Betsy Wilbom, Garrett Epps, and Gary Spitko for their helpful comments and
insights regarding this essay. The views expressed herein are entirely my own, as are any errors or
omissions.
1. See Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 539-40 n.254 (1988)
(describing the contemporaneous dismissal of legal realism by some academics on grounds that it
reduced law to a mere collection of judicial subjectivitics).
2. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984) (arguing
that the members of the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement should be excluded from law schools
because, in his view, they espouse a dangerous and misguided form of nihilism). For a discussion of
the genesis of the nihilism rap against CLS and related approaches to legal scholarship, see Joseph
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). Cf.
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conflict has not yet been determined. Although a perusal of a recent issue
of the Current Index to Legal Periodicals immediately demonstrates that
"outsider" scholarship is becoming increasingly mainstream,3 some promi-
nent academics and jurists openly call for a counter-revolution.4 In sum,
an ongoing Kulturkampft presently exists within the legal academy regard-
ing both the direction and meaning of legal scholarship.
Conflicts inevitably breed casualties and sometimes even atrocities.
In my view, a recent volley fired by Professor Dennis W. Arrow should
be deemed a war crime.6 Open and honest debate about the wisdom of
nontraditional legal scholarship is both desirable and healthy. From time
to time, academics from both sides of the divide can and should raise the
"Admiral Stockdale" question: "Who are we, and why are we here?" Ad
hominem attacks, on the other hand, do not represent a form of construc-
tive engagement. It seems to me that the contribution to the debate offered
by Professor Arrow constitutes the latter rather than the former.
Discerning readers must immediately have wondered what had tran-
spired simply from the cover of the December 1997 issue of the Michigan
Law Review ("MLR"). The presence of four sets of quotation marks
around the word "Article" suggested rather strongly that something strange
was afoot. After all, how could such an obvious glitch make it past the
MLR's editorial staff? Rather than an error, it constituted a kind of
foreshadowing device.
For reasons that largely escape me, the MLR editorial board dedicated
over two hundred pages (228 pages, to be exact) to a clever prank.
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of Manners: How to Conduct a Conversation on Race-Standing,
Imperial Scholarship, andBeyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051, 1054-56, 1066-72 (1998) (arguing that too many
critics of nontraditional legal scholarship fail to engage the ideas set forth in such works and instead
rely upon ad hominem attacks leveled against the entire genre).
3. Although this observation is anecdotal, objective evidence also supports the existence of this
trend. A recent LegalTrac search for the terms "post-modem," "deconstruct," "deconstruction," or
"deconstructing," yielded well over 200 hits. Even Professor Richard Delgado, a persistent critic of
institutional resistance to "outsider" scholarship reports that "[o]utsiders currently have a substantial
presence in'elite' law reviews." Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize
Outsider Writing, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1352 n.15 (1992). Moreover, "most civil rights writing
published in top law reviews these days is written by women and minorities." Id. at 1353.
4. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNE SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Owen M. Fiss, The Law
Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1989); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response
to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 307 (1987).
5. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite."). The Kulturkampf was Germany's "official attempt to
create a homogeneous national culture" in the late nineteenth century. HELMUT WALSER SMITH,
GERMAN NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, 1870-1914, at 8
(1995).
6. See Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning"for
the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REv. 461 (1997).
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Perhaps the articles staff, tiring of a steady diet of Foucault, Derrida, or,
for the less Eurocentric, domestic deconstructionists like Stanley Fish,7
decided to signal its sense of frustration with the collective output of the
legal academy.
Giving the student editors the benefit of the doubt, perhaps they con-
sidered Pomobabble a logical continuation of the project that the MLR
began in 1992 with its publication of Chief Judge Harry T. Edward's The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession.'
In this widely read and highly controversial article, Chief Judge Edwards
argued that U.S. law schools are in danger of losing sight of their core
institutional mission: the preparation of lawyers for practice and the
indoctrination of young lawyers as members of a profession.9 Legal
scholarship, according to Judge Edwards, should bear some relationship to
this core mission, by (at least potentially) being of some use to lawyers and
judges.1°
In 1993, the MLR continued to contribute in a constructive way to the
ongoing debate about the nature of legal education and legal scholarship by
publishing a symposium dedicated to legal education." This issue fea-
tured articles and essays by prominent legal academics, judges, and
practitioners.
Fast forward to 1997 and Professor Arrow's Pomobabble. In
Pomobabble, Professor Arrow parodies the new postmodern constitutional
jurisprudence by mocking both the style and substance of such scholarly
endeavors. There are fewer than three dozen pages of full text, and virtu-
ally all of these consist of dictionary-style definitions. The vast bulk of the
article consists of extremely long, seemingly stream-of-consciousness style
footnotes, with a great many literary references.' 2  To put the matter
simply, imagine Hunter S. Thompson as a professor of constitutional
law.'3  Now imagine a law review article by Hunter S. Thompson after
7. Professor Fish merits at least two mentions in Pomobabble. See id. at 470 n.40, 522. n.29.
For an example of Professor Fish's legal scholarship, see Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Setting the
Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997).
8. See Edwards, supra note 4.
9. See id. at 35-42, 57-66.
10. See id. at 42-57. As he put it, "In short, I believe that 'practical' scholars serve our whole
legal system: judges, legislators, and administrators, as well as practitioners, both private and public."
Id. at 56.
11. See Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1921 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 6, at 507 n.27, 585 n.39, 590-91 n.39 (citing Conrad); id. at461
n.1, 640-41 n.46 (citing Orwell); id. at 546 n.30 (citing Hemingway). On the other hand, the author
does provide amusing headings for his endless footnotes. See Arrow, supra note 6, at 526-38
(featuring in the following order these headings: "'We'?," "Professor Schleppfuss?," "France?,"
"Serotonin?," "Introspection?," "Diaries?," "Sunshine?," "Prozac?," "Life?," "Reality?," "Do You
Like Dada?," "Horror?," "Equality?"). This is, at best, a small offsetting consolation.
13. The possibility has a certain sitcom kind of appeal: Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas meets
Yale Law School. Cf. HUNTER S. THOMPSON, GENERATION OF SWINE: TALES OF SHAME AND
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Texas Law Review [Vol. 77:321
a really bad trip. That hypothetical article would probably look a lot like
Pomobabble.
Most readers will get the joke-some legal scholarship has devolved
so far into deconstructionist or postmodernist jargonism as to no longer be
coherent. Moreover, legal academics from a variety of ideological back-
grounds are falling prey to the siren song of "postmodern newspeak." 14
The trend is reasonably clear and Professor Arrow is perfectly entitled to
bemoan this turn of events. His satire is creative, witty, and often
biting.'
5
That said, if, as Shakespeare once wrote, "brevity is the soul of
wit," 6 then Pomobabble is not very funny. Shakespeare's aphorism
identifies a truth about comedy: as the length of a comedic exercise
increases, the payoff associated with the work must also increase
proportionately. Hence, a stand up comedian will often rely on a litany of
one-liners rather than tell a single hour long story. From this perspective,
one might fault Pomobabble as bad comedy; that is to say, the length of
the enterprise does not bear a reasonable relationship to its value as humor.
A reader who undertakes twenty pages of Pomobabble (i.e., approximately
ten percent of the total work) is apt to reap as much comic or satiric value
DEGRADATION IN THE 80S (1988) (containing various and assorted materials suggesting that Mr.
Thompson probably would not fit in very well as a law professor-even at Yale).
14. See Arrow, supra note 6, at 473 n.12 (citing Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the
Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REv. 853 (1995)). Professor Arrow's point is,
at least arguably, on the mark. Even nonmembers of the postmodemist scholarly community have self
consciously adopted rhetorical devices championed by so-called outsider scholars. See, e.g., Farber
& Sherry, supra, at 879, 884 (using postmodem nomenclature and narrative forms of argument in
support of their thesis that the "radical constructivist" critique of merit based selection schemes has
anti-Semitic implications); see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1727-31 (1985) (presenting a fictionalized narrative set at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787). Professors Farber, Sherry, and Van Alstyne are far from members of the CLS
choir. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5; Delgado, supra note 3, at 1355-56; see also Farber &
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
15. 1 particularly liked Professor Arrow's citation to You Are Special, written by Fred Rogers (aka
"Mr. Rogers"). See Arrow, supra note 6, at 553 n.33. Coming in a close second was Arrow's
reference to the Oklahoma City telephone book. See id. at 471 n.10. It boggles the mind to consider
the effort that the second year members of the MLR expended cite checking Arrow's article.
Notwithstanding the profoundly Sisyphean nature of the task, a very reliable MLR source has informed
me that, in point of fact, the second year staff did source gather and cite check Pomobabble-the
Oklahoma City telephone book and Barney's Imagination Island included. Karl Llewellyn would weep.
Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 189 (1960) (explaining that normally a "rule follows
where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule"). The traditional reasons associ-
ated with cite checking sources simply do not apply to Pomobabble. No one is likely to rely on the
veracity of the propositions asserted, nor are rcaders likely to rcly on the footnote source materials
without independently checking the sources. What's more, the occasional spelling error, misquote, or
similar glitch could simply be written off with a smile as "part of the fun." In my view, the task of
cite checking Pomobabble more befits the pages of a Kafka novel than the lived reality of a national
law review staff.
16. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act II, sc. II.
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from the "article" as someone who reads 228 pages of Pomobabble. Given
this state of affairs, a strong argument can be made that it is not possible
to justify Pomobabble's girth: the gag runs dry well before the article
concludes.
Perhaps the editors thought that the length of the article enhanced the
strength of their "statement." Certainly, running a book-length prank does
reflect a stronger sense of mission than running a shorter and more obvious
"humor" piece. That said, the opportunity cost of making such a statement
seems far too high to pay, at least if the editors of the MLR view their
publishing labors as a worthwhile enterprise.,7
It is perhaps understandable that the MLR would find sufficient merit,
or utility, in Arrow's article to justify according it a few pages. The fact
of the matter, however, is that the MLR afforded Arrow's work the better
part of an entire issue. Do pages in national law reviews come so cheaply
that a political prank (albeit a very clever one) merits 228 pages? The
entire MLR symposium on legal education consumed 298 pages of text;
Chief Judge Edwards's provocative initial volley totalled a svelte forty-four
pages. One does not have to question the spirit in which the MLR elected
to run Pomobabble in order to question the resource allocation that publish-
ing this piece in the "Director's Cut" version represents.' 8
Going beyond relatively easy questions regarding the opportunity cost
of the space allocation, there is a larger question that the MLR's editorial
decision raises: Is there so little scholarship of merit available to the MLR
that allocating an entire issue to Pomobabble represents a reasonable editor-
ial decision? The articles editors must have resolved this question
affirmatively, otherwise they would have allocated the space to something
else or required Professor Arrow to put his magnum opus on Slim-fast.
This is a profoundly depressing statement for a national law review to
make to the professorate.
As winter ebbs and spring flows, younger (read: untenured) faculty
across the United States race to complete works in the hopes of presenting
their wares to the new editorial boards just assuming their year-long
stewardship of the nation's law reviews. Many law professors work long
hours and weekends, trying to complete works before the crush of
17. If they do not view legal scholarship as having any intrinsic value, perhaps they should consi-
der the wisdom of abandoning the enterprise. If the choice is truly between publishing pomobabble
and publishing nothing, the more honorable course of action would be to publish nothing.
18. Cf. Keith Aoki & Garrett Epps, DeadLines, Break Downs & Troubling the Legal Subject or
"Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Meta, "73 OR. L. REv. 551 (1994) (using a comic book format to
note the difficulties that can sometimes arise between student editors and non-traditional authors, gently
parodying alternative forms of scholarship, and, perhaps most importantly, offering up a kind of visual
paean to the Grateful Dead). If a picture is worth a thousand words, perhaps Professor Arrow might
take a lesson from Professors Aoki and Epps.
1998]
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examinations and the pleasures of a summer associate's existence take
articles editors' minds from legal scholarship to exam panic followed by
the relatively indolent state of summer associatedom. 19
Between January and April 1998, I read nearly a dozen law review
articles by colleagues from law schools across the country. None of these
articles takes up Foucault, Fish, or Derrida. All of them, it seemed to me,
spoke to issues that were relevant to judges, practitioners, and other legal
academics. Legal scholarship is not limited to "pomobabble." Indeed,
even within the field of constitutional law, pomobabble is the exception
rather than the rule.' To the extent that the MLR's editorial decision to
publish Pomobabble reflects a contrary inference, I think that it is quite
mistaken. Moreover, to the extent that pomobabble finds currency in the
pages of elite national law reviews, it is as much a function of the tastes
and sensibilities of student law review editors as it is of constitutional law
scholars.2'
One could take Pomobabble as a particularly cynical exercise; as
between editing and publishing 228 pages of gibberish and 228 pages of
something else, there is no reason to prefer the latter to the former. In
some sense, this argument would go, all contemporary legal scholarship
constitutes pomobabble and Professor Arrow is to be praised for his
candor. Given that the emperor has no clothes, Arrow, like the young boy
in the children's tale, should be lauded for stating openly what we all
19. Having served as an articles editor on the Duke Law Journal and also having served as a
summer associate in four law firms over the course of three summers, I have relevant first-hand knowl-
edge on this issue. Were I to provide a narrative account of my experiences in this footnote, however,
I would risk proving Professor Arrow's point.
20. See, e.g., Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911
(1995); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional
Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1995); John C. Yoo, The
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311 (1997). Even scholars identified with the
CLS movement often write articles that speak to general audiences. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Policy
Distortion and Democratic Deliberation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real
Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997). This is not to say, however, that so-called "outsider" scholarship
lacks merit simply because it is not directed at majoritarian tastes or sensibilities. See Delgado, supra
note 3, at 1349 (tracing Critical Race Theorists and Feminist Legal Scholars' rise from marginalized
outsider scholarship to prominence in top law schools and law reviews and reporting on horror stories
associated with the early years of postmodern legal scholarship); Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado,
Outsider Scholars: The Early Stories, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1001 (1996) (surveying the rise of out-
sider scholars in law reviews). But cf. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
222, 227 (1984) (describing the CLS movement as a form of "nihilism" and urging that the "nihilist
who must profess that legal principle does not matter has an ethical duty to depart the law school").
21. In fairness to the student editors, there is undoubtedly some relationship between the scholarly
tastes of the professorate at a particular law school and the editorial policies of the student editors. See
Edwards, supra note 4, at 38-42, 61-64; Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law
Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1132-35 (1995).
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secretly know to be true. If this argument is correct, I must rethink my
professional commitments.
At the risk of appearing terminally naive, I have always assumed that
legal scholarship, in whatever form, had as its object influencing the
direction of the law-ideally by moving judges, lawyers, legislators, and
bureaucrats to rethink or reconsider a particular problem. Whether the
argument uses doctrinal analysis, tells a story, or musters empirical social
science data, the author's objective is to alter the existing legal landscape-
to push or pull the law in a particular direction. 2
Most law review articles will fail in this effort and most law profes-
sors expect that their work will go unnoticed. But the improbability of
success does not make the effort a waste of time and energy. If probability
of success were the sole criterion for evaluating whether to attempt a par-
ticular undertaking, most human endeavors would grind to a halt. Millions
of people play a variety of sports; most players are mediocre (at best). For
every Michael Jordan there are literally millions of hacks whose play
brings them no glory or positive attention (much less lucre). For every
Mozart, there are thousands of would-be composers whose works are not
as pleasing to the ear as they might wish (or believe). Does the fact that
most who try will fail make the effort a waste of everyone's time and
effort?
In the case of legal scholarship, I think the answer to that question is
"no." Even if I knew to a moral certainty that citations to my writings
never would grace the pages of the United States Reports, I would not
cease my labors for even an instant. The cause and effect relationship of
a legal scholar's labors is not an exercise in Euclidean geometry or pool
hall skill. When a legal academic plants the seed of an idea, whether with
a reader or a student, there is no way of knowing what effect it may ulti-
mately have on either the recipient or the larger community. This basic
indeterminacy is both the promise and curse of being a legal academic.
A practicing lawyer enjoys the benefit of seeing, usually in relatively
linear terms, a cause and effect relationship between her efforts and partic-
ular results. A lawyer files an appeal for her client, the court of appeals
either grants or withholds relief; perhaps it grants relief based on an
22. Compare CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN passim
(1979) (arguing that Title VII should be read to provide women with legal protection from sexual
harassment in the workplace, including "hostile work environments"), with Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67, 73 (1986) (adopting Professor MacKinnon's position that Title VII
prohibits sexual harassment in private workplaces including claims based on the existence of a "hostile
work environment"). Relatedly, the very existence of the Alaska Law Review demonstrates the
perceived relevance of legal scholarship by at least one state bar association. Although Alaska lacks
a law school within its borders, the Alaska Bar Association has made arrangements with the Duke Law
School for the publication of the Alaska Law Review. Obviously, the bench and bar in Alaska believe
that legal scholarship confers tangible benefits on the Alaska legal community.
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argument contained in the lawyer's brief. If it does so, the lawyer may
take some measure of professional pride in securing through the exercise
of her legal skills the result that her client desired. Conversely, if a lawyer
fails to convince a judge to hold in her client's favor, the relationship
between her efforts and the ultimate resolution- of the case also remains
true-even if the causal connection is more painful.
Unlike a practicing attorney, a law professor's efforts do not bear
immediate fruit. Whether teaching students in a classroom setting or
engaging in scholarly activities, a law professor has to place some hope in
the ultimate efficacy of her efforts without getting the benefit of actually
seeing the relationship between effort and result. That such a relationship
even exists is, to a large degree, a matter of professional faith.
Nevertheless, the first premise of our enterprise is that what we do matters
both to our students and to the larger community in important ways.
With these thoughts in mind, let us return to Pomobabble. Not only
does the MLR's decision to publish Pomobabble in an unredacted form
raise serious and troubling questions about the editors' attitude toward legal
scholarship, it also raises serious and troubling questions about Professor
Arrow's motivations for writing it. Make no mistake, Pomobabble repre-
sents a major undertaking on his part. It roams across a vast expanse of
knowledge, from main-line legal scholarship, to pop culture, to relatively
complex theories of language and epistemology. There is some method to
his madness (which perhaps explains, at least in part, the MLR's decision
to publish the article).
Does Professor Arrow view the time and effort he expended writing
Pomobabble as well spent? Put differently, is his point that writing
Pomobabble reflects a use of time and effort that is no more, and no less,
legitimate than the time and effort expended on more traditional scholarly
efforts? Given the scope of his effort, it is difficult not to reach such a
conclusion.'
To the extent that the MLR's decision to publish Pomobabble reflects
a profound cynicism, this cynicism is more than matched by Professor
Arrow's decision to author the ........ Article"""". In-this sense, Professor
Arrow's work is a powerful, but sad, statement about the contemporary
legal academy and the value of its scholarship. One might ask Professor
Arrow if contemporary constitutional scholarship is so awful, why not
produce a less esoteric work that demonstrates the potential excellence of
23. By way of comparison, the Journal of Legal Education regularly publishes "humor" pieces.
See, e.g., Eric J. Gouvin, Catty Remarks About Animal Correctness, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (1997).
These articles vary in their subject, style, and execution, but never exceed more than a few dozen pages
in length and are usually considerably shorter.
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an alternative conception of the scholarly project? National law reviews
regularly publish works that do not constitute pomobabble.
Perhaps Professor Arrow assumed that efforts spent on a more
traditional, doctrinal work would go unnoticed and unrewarded by most
preeminent law reviews. Such an assumption would be reasonable, given
the elaborately structured hierarchy that pervades the article selection
process. An identical article submitted by a person holding an academic
appointment at the Yale Law School will probably receive a stronger law
review placement than it would if submitted by a person holding an
appointment at LSU.24 Most law review editors do not conduct double
blind reviews of submissions and, as a result, submissions by persons from
high profile law schools enjoy something of a competitive advantage in the
article placement sweepstakes. 2 Chief Judge Richard Posner has argued
that "[t]he reputation of the author, corresponding to a familiar trademark
in markets for goods and services, is one [criterion], and not the worst."26
Many law reviews use not only a particular author's reputation as a
shorthand, but also use the author's institutional affiliation as a convenient
proxy for gauging the probable merit of a submission.
Authors seeking expedited reviews of their articles know all too well
the routine. Law reviews invariably ask would-be authors to provide, in
the order requested, the following information: name, title of the article,
24. See James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 527, 530-31 (1994)
(describing the importance of hierarchy in many law reviews' consideration of authors' manuscripts);
see also Erik M. Jensen, The Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC.
383, 385 (1989) ("To get the stack of manuscripts to a manageable level, editors need some winnowing
criterion; credentials, which bear some relationship to the quality of an author's past work, serve that
function.").
25. I can rcport that, as an articles editor at the Duke Law Journal, I routinely read submissions
from professors at top ten law schools as quickly as possible, on the assumption that an appointment
at a top ten law school probably represented an effective proxy for merit. That is not to say that I did
not read submissions from other authors, nor is it to say that I unfailingly recommended the publication
of articles submitted from professors at elite law schools. I am simply reporting that submissions from
professors at elite law schools received more immediate attention than many other submissions. See
Lindgren, supra note 24, at 528, 530-31. Given the tsunami of submissions, attempting to give every
submission the same amount of attention would not have been an effective way to approach article
selection. See Posner, supra note 21, at 1133-34. This is, of course, an embarrassing confession for
me to make. All editorial decisions should rcflect the merit of the particular work in question and not
the perceived rank of the author's stationary. Cf. The Articles Editors, A Response, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 553, 554 (1994) (arguing that student editors should not rely on "credentials rather than merit"
but also observing that relying on credentials might not be such a bad thing because "[a]fter all,
professors get jobs at elite schools precisely because they arc good, original writers").
26. Id. at 1133-34. On the other hand, Judge Posner notes that other "dysfunctional" shorthands
include "the congeniality of the author's politics to the editors, the author's commitment to gender-
neutral grammatical forms, the prestige of the author's law school, a desire for equitable representation
for minorities and other protected or favored groups, the sheer length of an article, the number and
length of footnotes in it, and whether the article is a 'tenure article' on which the author's career may
be riding." Id. at 1134.
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law review offer in hand, the deadline that the author has received, and the
law school at which the author holds an appointment. Plainly, the third
and fifth items speak to hierarchy rather than to necessity. Law review
editors do not need to know where an author teaches or which law review
has offered to publish her article in order to determine the merit of her
submission. As a theoretical matter, a submission's merit should stand or
fall on the quality of the author's research and writing. The rules of the
game strongly suggest, however, that factors unrelated to pure merit
(however defined) will play an important role in a given law review's
publication decision.
As it happens, Professor Arrow teaches at the Oklahoma City
University School of Law.' Given the institutional hierarchies associated
with the article selection process, Professor Arrow's chances of securing
an MLR placement for a doctrinal piece are substantially lower than they
would be if he held an appointment at Northwestern.' In this respect,
Professor Arrow's decision to invest significant effort on Pomobabble
might be viewed as a prudent allocation of time and energy. Indeed, hav-
ing cracked the MLR, his chances for publishing subsequent works in top
twenty-five law reviews is now significantly enhanced. Although a strong
past publication record does not necessarily ensure that a future work will
receive a good placement, it does make it more likely that the author's
work will get more serious attention, in a shorter period of time, than in
the absence of such a record.
I do not have an answer for the problem of hierarchy in the article
selection process. Given the practice of multiple submissions, it seems
inevitable that student editors at upmarket journals will have to use a
variety of shorthands to keep up with their overflowing inboxes.29
27. See Arrow, supra note 6, at 461 n.2 (reporting that Mr. Arrow is "Professor of Law,
Oklahoma City University" and explaining that "not wishing to privilege even my personal (let alone
my relational) identity . . over the context of my discourse, I have, in the interests of avoiding
crypto-hegemonic behavior, left the traditionae identification until this point in the text" (emphasis in
original)).
28. See Arrow, supra note 6, at 461 n.2 (admitting that it was unlikely his article would be pub-
lished in a top journal (citing THOMAS MANN, DOCTOR FAUSTUS 3-4 (H.T. Lowe-Porter trans.,
Vintage Books 1992) (1947))); Lindgren, supra note 24, at 530. Note also that the hierarchy repeats
itself in the citation practices of many authors. An article published in the MLR is far more likely to
be read and cited than an identical article published in the University of Hawaii Law Review. Indeed,
a colleague of mine published his first post-law school scholarly effort in the University of Hawaii Law
Review; the article is an excellent piece on gay essentialism and the possible intersection of biology and
equal protection/substantive due process doctrine. See E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic Argument for Gay
Essentialism-Determinism: Implicationsfor Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW.
L. REV. 571 (1996). Without pointing any fingers or naming any names, this article has not been cited
with the frequency of other works in the same area, even when the article is, at least arguably, more
directly on point than the articles cited. As it happens, I plead guilty to following the same general soi.
of citation convention. I am much more likely to read and cite an article that appears in the MLR than
an article published in the University ofHawaii Law Review. Given the abundance of scholarly outlets,
perceived rank becomes an all too easy marker for quality, notwithstanding the obvious pitfalls and
biases built into such an approach. See Posner, supra note 21, at 1133-35.
29. The Duke Law Journal's practice of affording expedited review to articles cireulated to no
more than five journals merits some consideration in this regard. See Announcement, New "Priority
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Moreover, it is not clear that peer-edited journals are significantly less
hierarchical in their selection procedures.3 0
To the extent that these considerations might have motivated Professor
Arrow, his decision to pen Pomobabble comes into clearer focus. On the
other hand, whether the MLR should have published Pomobabble in unex-
purgated form remains, at least in my own mind, a matter about which rea-
sonable minds could disagree.
If the decision to publish Pomobabble does in fact reflect a genuine
sense of concern about the direction of legal scholarship, other more
constructive options existed. For example, the editors could have spon-
sored a symposium on the state of legal scholarship. The Stanford Law
Review published a symposium on student-edited law reviews three years
ago,31 and, as noted above, the MLR published a symposium on legal
education five years ago.32 Debate about the nature and direction of legal
scholarship is not only desirable, it is essential to the vitality of the legal
academy. Indeed, it seems particularly appropriate to consider such issues
systematically as we approach the close of the twentieth century. Rather
than simply facilitating the trashing of a trend that seems disturbing or
undesirable to a particular author, why not attempt to shed some light on
the larger problem (assuming, for the moment, that a problem exists)?
Constructive engagement, rather than mud slinging, is in order.
At the end of the day, Professor Arrow's satire undoubtedly will
provoke much debate in the halls of law schools across the United States
about the nature of the scholarly enterprise. I also suspect that the student
editors' decision to publish Pomobabble will outrage faculty coming from
a wide variety of ideological positions. In this sense, Pomobabble might
serve some larger purpose and confer a benefit on the legal community.
Whether it represents a justifiable allocation of scarce pages and staff
resources remains a question about which I harbor some rather serious
doubts.
Pomobabble's potential audience consists not only of legal academics,
but also of law students, judges, practitioners, and the general public who
rely on the nation's law schools to graduate high quality lawyers. In the
end, however one views Pomobabble's ultimate merits, the piece speaks to
anyone who cares (or should care) about legal scholarship in the United
States. To this extent, and perhaps to this extent only, kudos are in order.
30. Even when periodicals attempt to use "blind" selection procedures, reviewers often have a
good idea of who is writing what in their field. This is particularly true in highly specialized areas of
scholarly inquiry (i.e., Russian environmental law). See The Articles Editors, supra note 25, at 554-55
(noting that acknowledgment notes, textual references to earlier articles by the same author, and foot-
note content offer substantial indication of an author's identity).
31. See Symposium, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995). In addition to the
Stanford symposium, Chicago-Kent and Akron have also recently published symposia on legal
scholarship. Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 743
(1996); Symposium, Who Needs Law Reviews?:Legal Scholarship in theAge of Cyberspace, 30 AKRON
T T), 172 (100O*%
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One can only hope that the debate Pomobabble generates will actually
engage the serious issues that divide legal academics, judges, and practic-
ing lawyers-rather than offer up a host of raspberries to a bewildered
readership.
